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Abstract  
 
The political economy literature on agriculture emphasizes influence over political 
outcomes via lobbying conduits in general, political action committee contributions in 
particular and the pervasive view that political preferences with respect to agricultural 
issues are inherently geographic. In this context, ‘interdependence’ in Congressional 
vote behaviour manifests itself in two dimensions. One dimension is the intensity by 
which neighboring vote propensities influence one another and the second is the 
geographic extent of voter influence. We estimate these facets of dependence using 
data on a Congressional vote on the 2001 Farm Bill using routine Markov chain 
Monte Carlo procedures and Bayesian model averaging, in particular. In so doing, we 
develop a novel procedure to examine both the reliability and the consequences of 
different model representations for measuring both the ‘scale’ and the ‘scope’ of 
spatial (geographic) co-relations in voting behaviour. 
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How Large Is Congressional Dependence in Agriculture? 
Bayesian Inference About ‘Scale’ And ‘Scope’  
In Measuring A Spatial Externality 
 
1. Introduction. 
Despite its importance, Congressional voting on agricultural legislation has received little 
attention in the literature. Noteworthy exceptions (Daft 1964; Fort and Christianson 1981; 
Brooks, Cameron, and Carter 1988; and Mehmood and Zhang 2001) focus attention on 
‘constituent-internalized’ determinants of political preferences measured by the impacts of 
covariates on voting propensities of constituents. Yet, political lobbying activities, political 
action committees, and other collective, rather than private, actions also influence agricultural 
legislation. In addition, Congressional voting, by its nature, is inherently geographic. The joint 
existence of ‘collective-externalized’ dependence and geographical influence raise questions 
about statistical models that fail to account for political externalities. When such externalities 
exist it is important to measure their magnitudes, their influence, and the extent of any bias 
arising in neglecting their presence.  Geography is occasionally included in multiple regression 
models of vote dependence, yet the spatial econometric methods that model spatial dependence 
have not been fully developed and utilized in empirical studies of political economy. Two, 
important questions arising warrant further exploration: the intensity of the political externality; 
the extent of its geographic range.  
We present procedures for answering these questions through an investigation of the 
geographic pattern of political influence in the 2001 Farm Bill. Our procedures are based on 
computational advances in Bayesian inference. They provide robust estimates of both the 
intensity of geographical interdependence and the range of the spatial externality in 
Congressional voting. In so doing, they generate a more nuanced understanding of the 
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complexities underlying US farm legislation vote outcomes. Section two presents a brief review 
of the relevant literature; section three outlines our estimation procedures; and section four 
presents the data used in the empirical application. The results are presented in section five and 
section six concludes. 
2. Motivation 
Public choice models of Congressional voting have been studied for decades and a large 
literature exists on the primary determinants affecting legislators’ votes.  However, less is so in 
agriculture.  Thematic developments in the general literature related to ‘the political economy of 
agricultural policy,’ are available in the comprehensive review within the Handbook of 
Agricultural Economics series, contributed by de Gorter and Swinnen (2002).  Their review of 
the extant literature (up until 2002), identifies several important, independent themes emerging 
in the political-economy-within-agriculture setting.   Considerable attention is devoted toward 
general agricultural policy interventions  (see, for some fairly heterogeneous, general examples, 
Schultz, 1978; Gardner, 1987; Alston and Carter, 1990; de Gorter and Tsur, 1991; and 
Binswanger and Deininger, 1997).  Specific attention is devoted to: (a) protections across 
countries, sectors and over time (see, for example, Fulginiti and Shogren, 1992; Beghin and 
Kerallah, 1994); (b) the influence of political institutions (for example, Rausser, 1982); (c) 
developing a framework for analysis of multifaceted political factors, including collective action 
by lobby groups (as motivated by Olson, 1971, 1985), political support function initiatives 
(Peltzman, 1976; Hillman, 1982; Swinnen and de Gorter, 1993; Swinnen, 1994), strategic 
interaction between lobby groups and politicians (for example, Zwart and Meilke, 1979; Beghin, 
1990; Bullock, 1994; and Bullock, 1995), empirical studies of revealed preference (Rausser and 
Freebairn, 1994), and empirical studies of lobbying and politician behaviour (see, for a 
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comprehensive set of examples, de Gorter, 1983).  Coverage of important, although, perhaps, 
ancillary, questions, at least to present purposes; such as explaining the use of inefficient 
instruments (see, for example, Swinnen et al., 2000), empirically assessing the importance of 
inefficient instruments (Swinnen et al., 2012) and explaining public investments in agricultural 
research (see the literature cited in Anderson et al., 1994) lead to a well-rounded coverage, with 
few, remaining agenda’s for future research.  Notwithstanding this conclusion, one notably 
absent feature of this comprehensive coverage is the issue of spatial interconnection or the extent 
to which spatial inter-dependence could impact political actions.  Thus, scope exists for detailed 
examination.   
 Geographic considerations have received very little attention in the econometric specification 
of such models. Usually, geographic considerations are ignored completely or are handled in an 
ad hoc manner by specifying regional dummy variables or by using other proxies. However, for 
a variety of reasons, the vote of a legislator in one district may be geographically correlated to 
the vote of a legislator in an adjoining district. This may be due merely to the fact that adjoining 
regions share similarities, to a desire for homogeneity between trading regions, or to serendipity. 
As Thorbecke (1997, p. 5) states: “[M]embers of Congress vote to redistribute wealth towards 
their constituents. It is assumed that they are responsive to both their electoral and geographic 
constituencies.” Yet, by and large, discrete-choice, political-economy contributions – including 
those in agriculture – have failed to take full account of the importance of geographic 
constituency.  
 A typical tool in these studies is the probit model, which generates the so-called ‘marginal 
effects’ measuring the likelihood that a change in a covariate affects a vote outcome, which have 
significant implications for policy. In voting parlance, relevant to political action committee 
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(PAC) contributions, these marginal effects are the additional contributions required to achieve 
either a ‘yea’ or a ‘nay’ vote. Given the apparent significance of these contributions, it is not 
surprising that they have become extremely sensitive and, at times, emotionally laden 
instruments in the formation of government policy. This important feature of the political 
economy of agriculture begs three questions. First, are the marginal probabilities derived from 
standard political economy investigations affected by externalities in voting behaviour?  Second, 
if so, then, by how much?  Third, can we estimate the precise magnitude and geographic scope 
of these voting externalities?  We note here that the geographic externality has both ‘scope’ and 
‘scale’ components, which we explore in our empirical approach   
We exploit a Bayesian spatial probit model and link it to recent developments in the literature 
on Bayesian model selection and Bayesian model averaging.  While this analysis demonstrates 
the methodology, it also contributes to understanding a long-established interest in vote 
behaviour.  
Early interest originates from a study of the 1963 Wheat Referendum (Daft, 1964). The 
referendum was a vote for a government sponsored two-price plan incorporating acreage 
allotments and land retirement. Over a million wheat farmers in the US voted. The referendum 
was defeated, garnering only 48 percent support when it needed a two-thirds majority for 
passage. Daft sought to uncover the determinants of state support for the referendum. She used 
as the dependent variable the percentage voting ‘yes’ in each of 28 states (the 28 that had at least 
5000 farmers voting). The biggest factor contributing to a ‘yes’ vote (negatively, it emerges) is 
the percentage of farmers in the state who were considered to be ‘part-time.’ Daft’s seminal 
contribution presented empirical findings with substantial content for policy; stemmed interest in 
the general notion that vote outcomes may ‘co-vary;’ and called forth, somewhat sluggishly, a 
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literature rationalizing vote outcomes in agriculture.  Fifteen years after Daft, Fort and 
Christianson (1981) distinguish strength of preferences for public service provision among rural 
residents. As they note, conflict exists because urban voters typically pay for below-capacity or 
inefficient rural hospitals through taxes or insurance premiums. They analyze referenda votes on 
hospital provision using logit methodology and conclude, among other findings, that most 
referenda pass because the economic beneficiaries are geographically concentrated whereas 
those harmed through higher taxes or debt burden are more geographically dispersed. Thus 
emerges a thematic development acknowledging geographic dependence. 
Another thematic development on political action committee (so-called PAC) contributions 
soon arose. Wilhite (1988) examines the factors influencing whether a member of Congress 
votes pro-union, as determined by the American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial 
Organization (AFL-CIO) over the 1984 legislative session. He estimates a system describing 
union PAC contributions and the AFL-CIO pro-union rating for each candidate. In the equation 
explaining pro-union rating, Wilhite includes geographic-specific data on unionization; 
respectively, whether the state is right-to-work, the district’s or state’s prior Republican 
presidential vote percentage, and whether the state or district receives direct benefits from the 
legislation the AFL-CIO uses in establishing its ratings.  Stratmann’s (1992) study on logrolling 
uses House votes on six amendments to the 1985 farm bill and uses a simultaneous probit model 
to explain an individual legislator’s vote on three different bills individually affecting the dairy, 
sugar, and peanut industries. Explanatory variables include the proportion of farmers in the 
respective industries in the Congressional district, PAC contributions to the legislator from 
interests representing the respective industries, and party affiliation and ideological rating as 
determined by the American Conservative Union.  Seltzer (1995) examines the creation and 
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passage of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) of 1938 which establishes a national minimum 
wage but exempts agriculture. Geographic effects are incorporated by assessing the North-South 
differences in support for the Act, which imposes the minimum wage only on the relatively 
lower-wage Southern states.  Thorbecke (1997) accounts for geography in assessing the House 
vote on the North Atlantic Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) using, respectively, the Heckscher–
Ohlin, Stolper–Samuelson, and Ricardo–Viner theorems. He includes legislator variables as well 
as district-level demographic and economic data, industry and occupation data including percent 
of the constituency involved in farming, and dummy variables indicating the presence of 
industries that are expected to benefit or be harmed by NAFTA. His results show that geographic 
and constituent interests strongly influence legislator voting and can sometimes outweigh 
partisan interests. 
Brooks, Cameron, and Carter’s (1998) contribution is noteworthy, for several reasons.  In 
addition to promoting further development in the geography-versus-PAC themes, their work also 
illustrates the potential rewards abounding from deeper methodological inquiry.  They analyze 
the simultaneous interactions between congressional votes on sugar programmes and 
contributions from both pro- and anti-sugar PACs. Beneficiaries of sugar policy are few; there 
are fewer than 10,000 growers nationwide, with five corporations producing 90% of Hawaii’s 
cane and two producing half of Florida’s. The beneficiaries reap large rewards, because the 
domestic price from 1985-92 was almost two and a half times the world price and import quotas 
guaranteed US growers 85% of US sugar consumption. Sugar policy imposes large losses; the 
GAO estimates that consumers pay $2.50 for every dollar transferred to sugar producers. The 
authors employ a simultaneous equation system, with a voting equation and a pro- and anti-sugar 
contribution equation. Independent variables in the voting equation include the endogenous pro- 
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and anti-sugar PAC contributions, and the exogenous variables include contributions from PACs 
for other commodities to measure logrolling, value of sugar produced in the legislator’s district, 
agriculture committee membership, and ideology (the Americans for Democratic Action (ADA) 
rating). In the contribution equations independent variables include the endogenous propensity of 
the legislator to vote in the PAC’s favor and contributions of the opposing PACs, exogenous 
variables of the legislator’s margin of victory in the last election, seniority, committee 
membership, and ADA rating. In the pro-sugar equation the number of sugar farms is also 
included, and in the anti-sugar equation the rural-urban population ratio is used as a proxy for 
artificial sweeteners. The authors use probit and tobit maximum-likelihood for the system for the 
1985 and 1990 House votes and the 1990 Senate vote on amendments to omnibus farm bills. 
Results for the voting equation confirm that greater PAC contributions influence vote probability 
in the predicted direction, with an unexpected result that anti-sugar contributions are positively 
associated with a pro-sugar vote in the 1990 House vote. Results for the contributions equations 
confirm that a greater propensity to vote pro-sugar leads to greater pro-sugar PAC contributions 
and less to anti-sugar PAC contributions, except in the case of the 1985 House vote where the 
anti-sugar contribution coefficient is significantly positive. Another interesting result is that anti-
sugar PACs tend to contribute more generally, even to pro-sugar legislators, while pro-sugar 
PACs contribute more narrowly to supporters. Evidence is found that PACs react to contribution 
competition, donating more as the opposition’s donations rise. Membership on an agriculture 
committee does not significantly affect a legislator’s vote due to the presence of so many ‘yes’ 
votes from the much larger group of non-committee members. Results are mixed for the other 
independent variables. The descriptive statistics show, inter-alia, that anti-sugar PACs contribute 
much less to the relevant legislators, and are more general in deciding to whom to donate. This 
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fact seems to affect their results, where the implications for pro-sugar PACs have a sounder base 
in the empirical results than the implications for the anti-sugar PACs. The authors conclude that 
PACs contribute not to aid the election of sympathetic legislators, but to obtain favors in terms of 
policy votes or to ensure future support. Interests on both sides of the debate are influential in 
contributing, though their efforts and successes differ. 
Following Brooks, Cameron, and Carter (1998), several fundamentally relevant contributions 
appear outside of the realm of agriculture.  Mehmood and Zhang (2001) identify the factors 
affecting legislator votes in four selected House Endangered Species Act amendments proposed 
since passage. Hasnat and Callahan (2002) examine the determinants of Congressional votes on 
the 2000 bill to normalize trade relations with China. Colburn and Hudgins (2003) examine votes 
on legislation affecting the banking industry’s interstate branching and find relatively strong 
geographic influences. Additional contributions, such as Jenkins and Weidenmier (1999) and 
Calcagno and Jackson (1998), for example, have focused elsewhere, taking less explicit account 
of geography in explaining Congressional voting patterns. 
Importantly, Grossman and Helpman (2005) address the issue that national political parties 
have a set of policy objectives that they promote during campaigns, but that elected members of 
those parties do not have to abide by such objectives once in office but will, rather, obey more 
parochial concerns (especially given the strength of particular industries within one’s district that 
are affected by legislation).  If the party has an increased ability to punish legislators who do this, 
then the amount of deviation between what-was-campaigned-on and what-was-done-in-office by 
a particular legislator is reduced (a reduction in the so-called ‘commitment problem’).  Because 
the deviation is rarely zero, however, protectionist policies get passed (i.e., are supported by 
legislators) in districts populated by benefitting industries, and this is true even if national parties 
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campaign on free trade in order to win votes.  From a spatial perspective, the authors note that 
the “protectionist bias results whenever districts differ in their ownership shares of the industry-
specific factors … As we shall see, the geographic distribution of the industry-specific factors 
also plays a central role (p. 1240).”  The role of geography, though, is limited to allowing 
industry strength to differ between districts; the authors do not consider whether the degree of 
industry strength in a neighboring district influences the degree of the home-district legislator’s 
support of protectionism.  The presumption is that the costs and benefits and the bias stays within 
the district; e.g. if my district has a lot of sugar farmers, I would support a sugar tariff even if my 
party supports free trade and I campaigned on free trade.  However, without explicit spatial 
estimation we cannot test whether the bias persists or increases and under what set of 
circumstances this may occur.  The issue, then, appears to be ‘whether or not neighbours, even 
without their own vested interest constituents, are influenced by the vested interests of their 
neighbours (reflecting the fact that socio-economic inter-relationships do not obey constitutional 
boundaries).  The authors analyze, qualitatively, whether individual legislators are more 
concerned with their own constituents than with party platforms. The authors assume that 
‘constituents’ are strictly limited to being within the legislator’s district.  However, it seems 
desirable to test whether the ‘constituents’ affecting a legislator’s vote include people or 
industries in neighbouring districts. 
 Anderson, Rausser, and Swinnen, (2013) consider the impacts of protectionist biases and 
note, in particular:  “In 2004, existing agricultural and trade policies accounted for an estimated 
70 percent of the global welfare cost of all merchandise trade distortions, even though the 
agricultural sector contributes only 6 percent of global trade and 3 percent of global GDP.”  The 
protectionist biases referenced have significant and disproportional, detrimental effects on food 
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prices, poverty, and income inequality. Some interesting observations emerge.  Some reforms 
have been attempted but have not kept pace with advances and globalization in non-agricultural 
industries.  Distortions, even within a country, are not consistent among different products or 
sectors. Distortions become largest in response to exogenous price shocks as policy attempts to 
insulate domestic agriculture from world price fluctuations. There is a strong anti-free trade bias 
with agricultural policy. Further, the authors cite research showing that, as the number of farmers 
decreases, resistance to supporting them via distortionary trade policies shrinks, and therefore the 
distortions themselves increase.  But spatial concerns are left totally unaccounted.  The authors 
suggest that a research question remains as to why, given that regions of countries show some 
similarities in terms of distortionary policies, particular countries within a region show 
dissimilarities. Perhaps an appropriately crafted spatial investigation might shed light on this 
important question? 
 Finally, and more recently, Olper and Raimondi (2013), consider the effects of different 
electoral rules and reach similar conclusions to Anderson, Rausser and Swinnen (2013).  
Proportional and presidential (first-past-the-post) democracies – compared to majoritarian and 
parliamentary democracies – are associated with more public support for agricultural interests 
(who, as a small group, are more likely organized as a special interest).  They find less support to 
food consumers (who, as a large group or majority of the population, are less politically 
organized), and the size of the effect is larger for import-competitive sectors (vs. export sectors) 
and staple foods (vs. food mainly destined for export).  But how would the conclusions be 
affected by the infusion of spatial interaction among the various trade actors under 
consideration? 
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Collectively these contributions indicate the diversity of interest in the political economy of 
agricultural legislation formation, the over-arching importance of PAC contributions in 
agriculture and the inherently geographic nature of the industry and the legislators who vote to 
affect it.  However, they serve also to illustrate a general neglect of possibilities for spatial 
externalities in voting, considerations in geo-political-preference support and consequent impacts 
on policy.  These limitations motivate our empirical inquiry. 
3. Modeling Voting Behaviour 
In order to link vote behaviour to a spatial externality, consider voting to be the observed 
outcome of a process in which regional constituency, ‘spatial contiguity,’ and other factors affect 
vote outcomes. Formalizing, consider the relationship  
(1)  zi = ρ w-i′z-i + xi′β + εi, 
where i = 1, 2, .., N denotes a congressional voting district; zi, an element of the N-vector z ≡ (z1, 
z2, .., zN)′, is the propensity of the representative (of the constituency as determined by the 
congressional district) to vote in a particular way in district ‘i’; parameter ρ ∈ ( ρ , ρ ), a scalar, 
depicts the magnitude of spatial correlation in vote propensities; w
-i is the ((N-1)×1) vector of 
binary elements of wi ≡ (wi1, wi2, .., wiN)′, in which wij = 1 if i and j are ‘neighbours’ and wij = 0, 
otherwise, excluding wii; z-i denotes the ((N-1)×1) vector of latent responses obtained by deleting 
the ith element of z; xi ≡ (xi1, xi2, .., xiK)′ denotes a K-vector of covariates conditioning the latent 
response; β ≡ (β1, β2, .., βK)′ denotes the corresponding K-vector of response coefficients; and εi 
denotes a standard-normal random variable.  In the remainder we maintain the assumptions that 
εi is normally distributed with zero mean and unit variance and that the bounds on the spatial 
correlation, ( ρ , ρ ), conform to the usual eigenvalue conditions (Anselin, 1988). Some additional 
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notation will prove useful. Throughout, we use the convention that ƒa(b|c,d,..,e) denotes a type-a 
probability distribution function (pdf) for random variable b conditioned by the values of 
parameters c, d, .., and e. Hence, εi has distribution ƒN(εi|0,1). The unit-variance restriction is the 
standard assumption required for identification in the probit model (see, for example, Greene 
2003, p. 669). The normality assumption is a useful approximation which, in the absence of other 
motivating evidence, seems reasonable to apply. We observe data {xi, wi, yi} N1i=  where yi = 1 if 
the congressional vote in district i is a ‘yea;’ observe yi = 0 otherwise; and make inferences about 
θ ≡ (β′, ρ)′. Stacking observations in (1), 
(2)   z = ρWz + Xβ + ε. 
where W ≡ (w1, w2, .., wN) denotes the N-dimensional, square, symmetric matrix of binary 
contiguity indicators; X ≡ (x1, x2, .., xN)′ denotes an N×K matrix of observations on the 
covariates; and ε ≡ (ε1, ε2, .., εN)′ denotes an N-vector of disturbances with distribution 
ƒN(ε|0N,IN).  Here 0N is the length-N null vector and IN is the N-dimensional identity matrix.  
Bayesian estimation is complicated by the presence of correlation across observations, which 
is jointly manifested by the correlation parameter ρ and the design of the spatial contiguity 
matrix W. The conventional (non-spatial) probit model is nested as a special case of (2) 
whenever ρ = 0. Albert and Chib (1993) present an algorithm for posterior inference for the 
conventional probit model and LeSage (2000) extends their work to incorporate the spatial 
externality. We emphasize the two-part nature of the spatial externality, namely the magnitude of 
the correlation, manifested by ρ, and the design of the spatial contiguity, W. A heritage in 
applied adoption studies in agricultural and development economics, many of which are relevant 
in the present context, constructs W by setting elements wij = 1 if observations i and j are 
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‘neighbours’ and wij = 0 otherwise; and proceeds, conditionally, to estimate ρ. Case (1992) 
provides an example in agriculture and many others exist. The point that needs emphasis here is 
that usually, though not always, the definition of the ‘neighbourhood’ and thus the ‘span’ of the 
contiguity regions selected by the investigator are arbitrary. Yet, this choice has important 
ramifications for most of the policy implications drawn from formal analysis. Consequently, we 
seek inferences about two important components: the magnitude of ρ; the exact design of W. 
We define five, respective, contiguity matrices, where each alternative is related to another in 
a sequential expansion of the region of neighbourhood impacts. In the first model, which we 
denote M1, the contiguity matrix W(1), is defined by wij = 1 if observations ‘i’ and ‘j’ reside in 
neighbouring congressional districts, which are the fundamental units of analysis. Next, we 
define M2 to correspond to W(2), which adds those districts that are contiguous with the current 
ones (i and j). Continuing sequentially, the fifth model exhausts the entire sample, combining it 
into one single ‘neighbourhood.’ Thus, model selection centres on the five consecutive 
specifications of (2) where W(j), j = 1, 2, .., 5, denote the respective designs. It will also be useful 
to refer to the model in which no account is taken of spatial dependence.  This specification is, 
the ‘conventional probit model’ which we refer to as the ‘null-spatial-weight model’ W(0).  
Consequently, W(j), j = 0, 1, 2, .., 5, define six mutually exclusive and exhaustive delineations of 
the sample space.  Assessing and comparing formally the statistical evidence in favour of each 
competing formulation is a major contribution of the exercise, and provides an answer, supported 
formally by statistical evidence, to the question: How large is congressional dependence (i.e., its 
‘span’ or ‘scope’)?   
Algorithms for comparing the competing formulations are presented in Chib (1995) and Chib 
and Jeliazkov (2001) and an introduction to the ideas underlying the Markov Chain Monte Carlo 
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(MCMC) theory is presented in Gelfand and Smith (1990), Casella and George (1992) and Chib 
and Greenberg (1995).  Problematic is the need to employ a proper prior. 
Although the prior information concerning the alternative specifications is relatively diffuse, 
we present derivations in terms of the proper prior pi(θ) ≡ ƒN(β| oˆβ ,Cβo) × ƒN(ρ| oρˆ ,Cρo), which is 
the product of a multivariate-normal distribution for the response coefficients and a normal 
distribution for the spatial correlation.  We implement the prior using parameter values βo = 0K, 
Cβo = IK×5, ρo = 0, and Cρo = 5.  Given these values, inference is conducted with respect to the 
joint posterior distribution for the parameters, which is proportional to the likelihood for the data 
and the prior, namely pi(θ|y) ∝ ƒ(θ|y) × pi(θ|y).   
For pedagogic purposes, we first outline the steps required to implement conventional probit 
estimation; the spatial probit is then a straightforward extension.   
With respect to conventional probit estimation, the likelihood, ƒ(θ|y) ≡ ∏
=
N
1i
Φ(-xi′β) iy1−  × 
Φ(xi′β) iy , is complicated by the presence of the integrals implicit in the cumulative standard-
normal distribution functions Φ(-xi′β), and Φ(xi′β), i = 1, 2, .., N, respectively.  However, Albert 
and Chib (1993) show that these problems are easily circumvented, by augmenting the observed 
data likelihood ƒ(θ|y) with the latent responses, z, and, instead, focusing attention on the 
complete data likelihood ƒ(θ|y,z) ≡ ƒN(z|Xβ,IN). This formulation proves tractable because, even 
though we do not observe the latent z, its components can be efficiently estimated, given values 
for the unobserved elements in the coefficient vector, β. In this context, iterating sequentially 
between the two full conditional distributions comprising the joint posterior leads to iterations 
that simulate draws from the marginal distributions that we seek. The conditional distributions 
for β and z are, respectively 
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(3) β|z ~ ƒN(β|βˆ ,Cβ), 
where βˆ  = (X′X+ Cβo-1)-1 (X′z + Cβo-1 oˆβ ) and Cβ = (X′X + Cβo-1)-1; and  
(4) z|β ~ ƒTN(z| zˆ ,Cz,y),  
where zˆ  = Xβ, Cz = IN, and, for i = 1, 2, .., N, zi ≤ 0 if yi = 0, and zi > 0, otherwise.  Efficient 
one-for-one draws are obtained by exploiting the probability integral transform (Mood, Graybill, 
and Boes 1974, pp. 202-3).  Consequently, given a vector of arbitrary starting values, say z = z(0), 
efficient estimation of the conventional probit model is obtained by iterating the algorithm: 
 A1: Draw β(g) from (3). Draw z(g) from (4). 
Posterior inference is then conducted using the sample {β(g), z(g)} G 1g=  which is obtained by 
iterating A1 a total of G times, once a ‘burn-in’ – a point beyond which convergence is attained – 
is located.   
 In order to compare the evidence in favour of the conventional probit model against the 
alternative spatial probit specification, we need to compute the ‘marginal likelihood’ 
corresponding to each model. In the case of the standard probit, an efficient algorithm is 
presented in Chib (1995). It is implemented simply by running the algorithm A1 one additional 
time with the parameters β set at some high-density value, say β = β* (≡ θ*) and collecting an 
estimate of the posterior distribution for β, leading to the estimate (on the computationally 
convenient log scale), ln m(y) = ln ƒ(θ*|y) + ln pi(θ*) - ln pi(θ*|y). The first two components on the 
right-hand side are available by direct calculation but the third, in general, must be estimated. We 
estimate it from the reduced run by computing, pi(θ*|y) ≅ G-1 ∑g pi(θ*|y,z(g)). At the end of this 
reduced run an estimate of the model marginal likelihood is available and an estimate of its 
standard error is also available (Newey and West , 1987). 
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Complications in the spatial probit are overcome by a straight-forward extension of the 
MCMC method. Specifically, by appending one additional step to the algorithm A1 we can 
derive estimates of the expanded parameter vector θ ≡ (β′,ρ)′. The appended step involves 
drawing a sequence of observations {ρ(g)} G 1g=  conditional on the draws for the remaining 
unknowns, respectively β and z, and the basic algorithm, A1, is generalized in three ways.  First, 
because the full conditional distribution for the correlation parameter is not available in closed 
form, the draw for ρ is made by implementing a random-walk Metropolis-Hastings step.  This 
Markov Chain procedure is thoroughly explained in standard texts (see, Robert and Casella 
(1999) for background and LeSage (1997, 1999, 2000, 2002) and Holloway, Shankar, and 
Rahman (2002) for demonstrations).   
A second complication arises due to the fact that, under the assumption ρ ≠ 0, the individual 
draws for each component of z are conditionally correlated, rendering problematic derivation of 
the full set of latent responses. This problem is discussed in detail in Geweke (1994), where it is 
suggested that each of the draws in z must be made sequentially. Finally, a few modifications to 
the full conditional distributions in (3) and (4) are required by the fact that the response model 
now contains the binary-weights matrix, W. The conditional draws for β and z are, respectively 
(5)  β|z,ρ ~ ƒN(β|βˆ ,Cβ), 
where βˆ  = (X′X+Cβo-1)-1 (X′Az+Cβo-1 oˆβ ), A = IN-ρW and Cβ = (X′X+Cβo-1)-1; and  
(6)  zi|β,ρ ~ ƒtN(zi| izˆ ,Czi,y), i = 1, 2, .., N, 
where izˆ  = A
-1xi′β - Vii-1 Vi-i (z-i-X-iβ); V = A′A; Vii denotes the scalar appearing in the ith row 
and column of V; Vi-i denotes the (N-1)-dimensional row vector obtained by deleting the ith 
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column from the ith row of V; and the variance of the ith latent response is Czi = Vii-1. Third, the 
conditional distribution of ρ is proportional to  
(7) ρ|β,z   ~   |A| exp{-.5(Az-Xβ)′(Az-Xβ)} × exp{-.5(ρ- oρˆ )′Cρo-1(ρ- oρˆ )′}≡ κ(ρ|β,z), 
which has an unknown integrating constant. The corresponding Metropolis step involves 
drawing a proposal, τ ~ ƒN(τ|ρ,ζ), accepting the draw with probability  
(8)   α(ρ,τ) ≡ min{κ(τ|β,z) ÷ κ(ρ|β,z),1}, 
and adjusting endogenously the variance parameter, ζ, in order to target an acceptance rate of 
25% of the total draws. Experiments with simulated data suggest that an acceptance rate of about 
25% is highly satisfactory.  
 In summary, given arbitrary starting values, z = z(0), efficient estimates of the spatial probit 
model are obtained by iterating  
 A2:   Draw β(g) from (5). Draw z(g) from (6). Draw τ(g) from τ ~ ƒN(τ|ρ,ζ) and set  ρ(g) = 
τ(g) with probability (8). 
Finally, the model’s marginal likelihood, m(y), is estimated by running the algorithm an 
additional two times with β and then ρ set at their high-density values, β* and ρ*, respectively. 
Additional details are presented in Jeliazkov and Chib (2001). At the end of the reduced runs of 
A1 and A2 we are able to conduct posterior inference and determine whether a spatial externality 
in vote dependence exists; its location; its scale; and its span. 
4. Data 
The legislation under consideration is the conference report HR 2646 arising in the second 
session of the 107th Congress (which met in 2001 through 2002). Data on this legislation was 
most conveniently available for this study, though the methods can clearly be applied to other 
legislation, perhaps of richer character.  In the House, the bill was known as the Farm Security 
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Act of 2001. Data on the House vote (Roll Call 123, taken May 2, 2002) are collected at the 
Clerk of the House website,1 and an individual observation in our dataset corresponds to each 
Representative who was available to vote on HR 2646. The binary variable YEA is recorded as a 
‘1’ for a vote in favor of the conference report and recorded as a ‘0’ for a vote against the report 
or if the Representative did not vote. The binary variable DEMOCRAT is coded as ‘1’ for 
Democrats and ‘0’ for Republicans or Independents, and is collected from the House Office of 
the Clerk’s Official List of Members website.2 Congressional district information for the 
Representatives is also collected at the House Clerk Official List website. There are 348 votes, of 
which 233 are ‘yeas’ and 115 are ‘nays.’ 
In order to measure political influence, we collect data on whether the legislator was an 
incumbent and the popular support the legislator received in his most recent election. The 
INCUMBENT and WINLAST variables are derived from the Federal Elections Commission. Data 
for the Representatives relate to the 2000 election.3 The WINLAST variable is the percentage of 
the general election popular vote received by the candidate within their district. We also include 
a dummy variable AGCOM which equals ‘1’ if the Representative sat on the House Committee 
on Agriculture in the 107th Congress. Support for agricultural legislation could arguably be 
influenced by a legislator’s ideology, so we include the continuous variable LQ2001 for each 
observation. These variables represent the ‘Liberal Quotient’ determined by Americans for 
Democratic Action, Inc. (ADA), and correspond to the LQ score the legislator received from the 
ADA in 2001, covering the 107th Congress.4 
We include control variables to measure the influence of agricultural interests in the 
legislator’s district. The variable FARMEMPLOYUSDA represents the percentage of state 
employment in farm or farm-related occupations, taken from the Economic Research Service of 
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the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA).5 For the Representatives, we obtain the percentage 
of a state’s population residing in each Congressional district using data from the Census 
Bureau.6 We then multiply this by the state’s FARMEMPLOYUSDA to get district percent 
employment in farming. A last measure that we include in order to assess the influence of 
agriculture in the district is the amount of urbanization.  Assuming an inverse relationship 
between the degree of urbanization and the strength of support for agriculture legislation, we use 
the variable URBAN, which is the proportion of urban dwellers obtained from the Census 2000 
Summary File 1 for each Congressional District.7 
In order to measure the influence of agriculture political interests on individual members of 
Congress, we use data from the Center for Responsive Politics’ Opensecrets.org website, which 
compiles campaign contribution information in U.S. elections. For our purposes, we use reports 
on the Members of the 107th Congress.8 For each member, we create the variable AGPAC as the 
proportion of the representative’s total PAC contributions accounted for by ‘agribusiness’ PACs 
during the 2001-2 period.  This variable proxies for the relative significance of agricultural 
PACs in the member’s portfolio. We note that four of the observations on PAC contributions are 
negative. Data on contributions are collected on a two-year cycle consistent with the election 
cycle; a negative PAC contribution for the 2001-2002 period indicates that a contribution had 
been made to the candidate prior to 2001 but had been returned to the donor during the 2001-
2002 cycle. Similarly, a PAC may have made a donation to the candidate during the 2001-2002 
cycle and if the full amount was returned later in the same cycle, the PAC contributions variable 
would have the value zero. Finally, values of production and government payments are 
incorporated. Both measures are obtained from the National Agricultural Statistics Service’s 
(NASS) 2002 Census of Agriculture.9 The variable MVP (market value of payments) is the 
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average market value of production per farm in dollars and is intended to measure the relative 
size and influence of farms, relative to the non-agrarian economy, in a Congressional district. By 
averaging across the number of farms within the Congressional district, the variable proxies the 
average or ‘public’ impacts of payments.  The GP (government payments) variable is the 
average government payment per farm in dollars for those farms that receive payments. This 
variable is included in order to determine if farms receiving payments exert influence, and the 
averaging conveys better the notion of ‘public’ versus ‘private’ influence. Given that NASS does 
not disclose some of the data on government payments due to privacy concerns, the sample size 
is effectively reduced to 348 observations. Prior to estimation all covariates are normalized by 
their maximum values. 
5. Empirical Results 
In presenting results, we focus on the preferred specification that emerges from the model-
selection exercise. Table 1 presents the results of the models comparisons. The first column in 
table 1 indicates the model in question.  We estimate two versions of the models, namely one, 
which we refer to as ‘specification one,’ that excludes a constant term; and another, which we 
refer to as ‘specification two,’ in which the constant is included.  We refer to these formulations 
using the slightly modified notation W(i,j), wherein ‘i’ denotes ‘specification’ and ‘j’ denotes the 
‘spatial-weight model.’  These indications appear in column one in table 1.  The second column 
reports the estimate of the log-likelihood evaluated at the high density point.  The third column 
reports the logarithm of the marginal likelihood evaluated at the high density point.  The fourth 
column reports the numerical standard error of the log-marginal likelihood estimate.  The fifth, 
sixth and seventh columns report, respectively, and where available, the lower (2.5%) limit of the 
95% highest posterior density interval for ‘rho’, the posterior mean estimate of rho and the upper 
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(97.5%) limit of the 95% highest posterior density interval for ‘rho.’  And in column eight we 
report the implied posterior probabilities across the twelve-dimensional (the Cartesian product of 
‘specifications’ ⊗ ‘models’) model space.  
(Insert table 1 about here.) 
Several points are noteworthy. First, the high density point adopted is the posterior means of 
the parameters. Second, and, perhaps most importantly, neither the likelihood values nor the 
marginal likelihood values indicate that there exists a clearly dominant model. In particular, the 
rankings of the maximized and the estimated likelihood values diverge; both are different from 
the rankings obtained from comparing marginal likelihood values. Third, we observe a fairly 
sizable difference between the marginalized and the estimated likelihood values, indicating that 
the prior information is relatively influential in the model assessment exercise. Fourth, the 
posterior mean for ρ generated by each of the models in question varies substantially across the 
model space. Hence we deem it most important to identify the clearly dominant model, should 
one exist.  There are, in fact, three dominant models, namely W(1,1), a single-neighborhood 
specification in which the constant is excluded;  W(2,0), a null-neighborhood specification in 
which the constant is included; and, third, W(2,1) a single-neighborhood specification in which 
the constant is included.  We note, additionally, that the implied probabilities of these three 
separate specifications across the model space (namely 0.26, 0.12, 0.62) is exhaustive, summing 
to 1.00, net of rounding.  Thus, in further evaluation, we disregard the remaining models 
focusing our attentions on these three respective formulations.  We note further that one of the 
specifications (W(2,1)) is at least twice as likely to have generated the data as the other two.  We 
therefore focus on the formulation W(2,1) as the benchmark when discussing parameter estimates 
and marginal effects. 
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Still, probability masses of 0.26 and 0.12 are considered too large to ignore and given the 
added uncertainty that their presence creates, we conduct inference by combining estimates 
derived from each of the three candidate models, which Bayesians refer to as model averaging. 
Model averaging is advisable in many situations, but is particularly relevant in cases where 
the data fail to favour a single specification. The manner in which we combine model estimates 
is straightforward, but the conceptual underpinnings of the procedure are deep.  Examples of 
model averaging in agricultural economics are scarce, with one notable exception (Chua, 
Griffiths, and O’Donnell, 2001). Early work dates at least to Min and Zellner (1990) and to Palm 
and Zellner (1992). Since then numerous contributions appear and a selection that we find 
particularly insightful, include Draper (1995); Raftery, Madigan, and Volinsky (1995); Clyde 
(1999a, 1999b, 2000); Fernàndez, Ley, and Steel (2001a, 2001b); Hoeting, Raftery, and Madigan 
(1999, 2002); and Viallefont, Raftery, and Richardson (2001).  
A good introduction to Bayesian model averaging is presented in Koop (2003, pp. 265-282). 
Given a quantity of interest, say g(θ), we estimate its posterior distribution using a weighted sum 
of the probabilities in favor of each model under consideration. To perform this calculation we 
use the marginalized likelihoods computed in the previous section, exponentiate each one (they 
are estimated in natural logarithms), and place them in the formula 
(9)  ƒ(g(θ)|y) = ∑j wj ƒ(g(θ)|y,mj), 
where the weights are wj ≡ ℘j exp{log m(y|mj)} ÷ ∑j ℘j exp{log m(y|mj)} and the ℘j are prior 
probabilities satisfying the restriction ∑℘j = 1. 
The over-arching metric of the analysis is the posterior distribution of the correlation 
parameter. Figure 1 reports this distribution. The distribution has a slightly elongated tail to the 
left, but the overwhelming bulk of the draws reside on the positive real line. Thus, we conclude 
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with confidence that the impact of the spatial externality is positive. And we note also that the 
location and scale of the spatial lag parameter, ρ, shows that there is a spatial relationship 
between congressional districts and their vote behaviour, which confirms Thorbecke’s (1997) 
observation that Representatives are responsive to their geographic interests.  
(Insert figure 1 about here.) 
 Table 2 presents reports of posterior means of the parameter distributions. For the purpose of 
comparison, we present the estimates corresponding to the spatial-probit formulation W(2,1) and 
compare them to those under the conventional-probit specification, which, inclusive of the 
constant, is W(2,0). The first column lists the variable names; the second, third and fourth columns 
present posterior mean estimates of the spatial probit parameters, with 95% highest posterior 
density (HPD) intervals in parentheses; and the fifth, sixth and seventh columns present 
estimates of the conventional probit parameters, with 95% highest posterior density (HPD) 
intervals in parentheses. Only the HPD intervals corresponding to AGPAC and URBAN do not 
contain zero.  This result is consistent across the two formulations.  The positive coefficient for 
AGPAC indicates that there is a positive relationship between agricultural PAC contributions and 
the actions of legislators, which is in accordance with the idea that legislators are responsive to 
constituent interests. The URBAN variable is also deemed to be a determinant of legislator 
activity given the bounds of the HPD interval, but the association is negative. Congresspersons 
from urban areas tend to not support agricultural legislation presumably because 1) their districts 
contain little, if any, agricultural activity, and 2) subsidies for farming activities are viewed as 
hurting their constituents who must pay more for items such as milk and sugar, as well as other 
‘necessities.’  
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Comparing results obtained for the spatial probit formulation (columns two, three and four) 
with those derived for the conventional probit model (columns five, six and seven), some small 
but potentially important differences emerge in both the locations and the scales of the posterior 
distributions.  
These differences draw into question the magnitude of policy inferences that investigators 
draw from the respective exercises and raise demand for further examination.  These small but 
noteworthy differences between the two models are further confirmed with reference to the 
marginal effects estimates, which depict the impacts on the probabilities of achieving a ‘yea’ 
vote in response to changes in the covariates.  These estimates are reported in table 3.  In 
particular the marginal effects estimates indicate some important differences across both the 
spatial-probit with nearest-neighbour contiguity (columns two, three and four), W(2,1); and the 
non-spatial, conventional probit formulation (columns five, six and seven), W(2,0).  With 
reference, momentarily, to the spatial probit, the significance in parameter estimates of the 
covariates AGPAC and URBAN is now also exhibited by FARMEPLOYUSDA, DEMOCRAT, 
WINLAST, AGCOM, MVP, and ADA; while, in contrast, the conventional probit only uniquely 
identifies AGPAC and URBAN as with the mean effects.  Importantly, the potency of AGPAC 
response between the two formulations is quite different, with the scale of impact substantially 
larger under the preferred, spatial-probit, formulation.  These estimates clearly indicate that 
increases in PAC contributions generate ‘yeas’ within the House.  However, the precise impacts 
of these contributions across the complete sample space remain uncertain.  Thus scope arises for 
experimentation.  
(Insert table 3 about here). 
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Focusing on the increase in scale of PAC contributions that is required, according to these 
estimates, to ensure full compliance (a unanimous ‘yea’ vote across the sample), we consider the 
question of depicting differing patterns of influence across the alternative neighbourhood 
specifications.  Using the preferred formulation, W(2,1), as the benchmark against which to depict 
alternatives, we consider the pattern of adjustments corresponding to the non-spatial probit 
W(2,0), and the remaining, spatial-probit configurations, W(2,2), W(2,3), W(2,4), and W(2,5), where, 
instead of the posterior means estimates for ‘rho’ obtained under each formulation, we use the 
correlation mean reported under the preferred specification, namely, W(2,1).  The reason we do 
this is simple.  Conditioning upon a given correlation value but adjusting, ceteris paribus, only 
the neighbourhood ‘treatments,’ serves to emphasize the ‘range’ or the ‘scope’ of reach of the 
spatial externality influencing vote behaviour.  And it is this significant aspect of the voting 
externality the investigators have largely ignored.  Hence, these experiments are significant in 
the extent that they are almost surely the first of their kind within an agricultural-legislation-vote 
setting.  We conjecture also, that they may be seminal within the broader regional-economic and 
spatial-econometric literatures.  
Figure 2 presents the results of the policy experiment of increasing PAC contributions across 
the sample. The vertical axis reports the number of ‘yea’ votes and the horizontal axis reports the 
increments by which the PAC contributions must be altered in order to attain the outcome. There 
is a noteworthy difference in the responsiveness of ‘yea’ votes to these increases across the 
separate formulations and the rate of increase in ‘yea’ votes per unit increase in PAC 
contributions is different across the respective formulations.  Not only is the scale and location of 
the spatial correlation important, but it is considerably magnified by the extent to which a given 
correlation attains ‘reach’ throughout the sample.  And this latter aspect has been ignored to date.  
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Our results suggest that such neglect may significantly bias inferences and post sample policy 
predictions.  To the extent that the social-scientific laboratory used for our experiments 
exemplifies a wide and broader set of circumstances, such neglect is, likely, quite significant.   
(Insert figure 2 about here.) 
6. Concluding Comments 
We examine the hypothesis, hitherto neglected in the political-economy-of-agriculture literature, 
that Congressional votes are spatially correlated. Using recent advances in Bayesian 
computation, our spatial probit model highlights salient differences between it and the results 
obtained from conventional probit estimation. We have made considerable effort to emphasize 
that whenever a spatial externality is observed there are two important dimensions to its ‘nature.’  
One, which is typical of the empirical econometric literature, is the sign and magnitude of the 
spatial externality.  The other, which we claim has been largely ignored, is the geographic 
‘scope’ or ‘range’ of the spatial externality.  We have shown in this paper, using a set of robust 
Bayesian procedures, that both the scales and the scopes of the spatial externality are identifiable, 
are estimable and are implementable in posterior predictive settings.  We argue that such settings 
– hitherto ignored by agricultural economists – are important. 
 This basic methodology could be extended in at least two directions in order to obtain 
nuanced insights into spatial externalities. First, the nature of the findings here should be 
assessed in a wide and varied set of circumstances, including other spatially relevant data 
generating environments.  The one we have chosen is the one most convenient and, perhaps 
relevant to our audience, but others abound.  
 Second, with reference to PAC contributions in particular, but previous work in general, 
especially Baldwin and Magee (2000) and similar, one could consider PACs that may ‘mitigate’ 
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or are likely to support a ‘nay’ vote, though it may be difficult to identify such ‘nay’ PACs. 
Experience suggests that, while farmers and agribusinesses would support distortionary policies, 
those opposing them would be the much broader group of food consumers, who don’t have a 
realistic PAC to speak for them. While the pro-Farm-Bill PAC is easier to identify, anti-Farm-
Bill PACs are more difficult to identify.  For example, given the propensity of some United 
States legislation to contain ‘incentives’ to persuade opponents to sign up to ‘bills,’ identifying 
negative PACs and quantifying their impacts may be impossible.  Thus, further PAC related 
work should perhaps devote effort to diversifying the makeup of the potential covariates pool.   
 Finally we emphasize aspects of the Bayesian procedures, which are particularly useful in our 
setting.  One advantage, of Bayesian inference, is the marginalization of extraneous information 
– other than the data – from focal quantities.  Specifically, the important posterior distribution 
identified in figure 1 is not conditional on the values of other parameters within the model. 
Other quantities, useful in estimation, but extraneous to interpretation, have been integrated out 
of proceedings (if not analytically and exactly in closed form, then, at least, approximately and 
numerically), which, of course, is desirable.  This feature – an over-arching facet of all Bayesian 
investigations – is rarely emphasized despite its obvious advantages.   
 A second attractive feature of our approach is its ability to accommodate uncertainty about 
alternative models.  In the present setting we specify and examine twelve different versions, and 
it appears from the data that three have substantial support.  The Bayesian paradigm provides a 
coherent set of formulae with which to combine the respective models, on the basis of the 
statistical support for each element, across all of the available alternatives, comprising the 
conditional model space.  Here we use these methods to make robust assessments of the likely 
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scale and scope of an important spatial externality and focus attention on a hitherto ignored 
aspect of the social experiment.  We have shown this to be significant. 
 Third, because the data and parameters are unified in a coherent joint probability distribution 
function through a set of rational and consistent principles, we are able to derive, a posteriori, 
predictions, as one would in sampling-theoretic contexts, with one more desirable feature than is 
available there. Rather than point estimates about policy predictions, the Bayes estimate is 
contained within a full (marginal) probability distribution function characterizing support across 
the unknowns’ space.  In our example, the important unknown we examine is precisely the 
number of ‘yea’ votes arising in response to an increase in PAC contributions.  The response 
functions depicted in figure 2 are posterior means of separate probability distributions, derived at 
each point within the experimental space.  The distributions of the results of these experiments 
are derived without reference to extraneous parameters (which are removed from and by the 
estimation procedure) making the conclusions that we draw robust to concerns about the 
unknown values of other parameters within the systems. 
 These advantages, as usual, arrive at a cost, which is only sometimes significant.  The nature 
of this cost and its implications for analysis lie beyond the scope of this paper, but are discussed 
principally in Jeffries (1961); somewhat loosely in Zellner (1996); more formally, from a 
mathematical perspective, in Berger (1984); from a formal, foundational viewpoint, in Bernardo 
and Smith (1994); and, recently, in an interview between O’Hagan and Lindley devoted to some 
of the contentions surrounding widespread use of the Bayesian approach to inference.10   
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Footnotes 
1. http://clerk.house.gov/evs/2002/roll123.xml. 
2. http://clerk.house.gov/histHigh/Congressional_History/olm.html?congress=107h 
3. http://www.fec.gov/pubrec/fe2000/house.xls 
4. http://www.fec.gov/pubrec/fe1998/98senate.htm 
5. http://ers.usda.gov/Data/FarmandRelatedEmployment/ 
6. The “Fast Facts for Congress,” http://fastfacts.census.gov/home/cws/main.html, provide 
congressional district populations. 
7. http://factfinder.census.gov/servlet/DTGeoSearchByListServlet?ds_name=DEC 
_2000_SF1_U&_lang=en&_ts=107886252515  
8. http://www.opensecrets.org/politicians/candlist.asp?Sort=S&Cong=107 
9. http://www.nass.usda.gov/Census_of_Agriculture/ 
10. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=cgclGi8yEu4. 
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Tables 
 
Table 1.  Marginal likelihood estimates. 
 
 
 
 
Model 
Log 
Likelihood 
Log 
Marginal 
Likelihood 
Numerical 
Standard 
Error 
 
Rho 
2.5% 
Lower 
Limit 
Rho 
Posterior 
Mean 
Rho 
97.5% 
Upper 
Limit 
Implied 
Posterior 
Model 
Probability 
 
Constant  Excluded 
W(1,0) -186.95 -194.21 0.32 - - - 0.00 
W(1,1) -171.37 -189.16 0.83 (0.26) 0.44 (0.62) 0.26 
W(1,2) -180.76 -198.00 0.74 (0.12) 0.41 (0.67) 0.00 
W(1,3) -183.65 -202.12 0.18 (-0.11) 0.46 (0.84) 0.00 
W(1,4) -185.14 -202.93 0.19 (-0.32) 0.48 (0.93) 0.00 
W(1,5) -186.19 -203.03 0.24 (-0.62) 0.31 (0.90) 0.00 
 
Constant Included 
W(2,0) -181.93 -189.89 0.23 - - - 0.12 
W(2,1) -169.66 -188.27 1.25 (0.20) 0.41 (0.59) 0.62 
W(2,2) -178.56 -198.98 0.14 (-0.02) 0.30 (0.61) 0.00 
W(2,3) -180.83 -199.97 0.41 (-0.31) 0.24 (0.71) 0.00 
W(2.4) -182.09 -196.93 1.32 (-2.19) -0.21 (0.84) 0.00 
W(2,5) -181.02 -197.31 0.70 (-6.04) -2.76 (0.04) 0.00 
 
Note: Log likelihood and log marginal likelihood values are reported at posterior means 
of the regression coefficients and of the correlation parameter. Estimates are based on a 
burn-in sample size of S = 100,000 and a Gibbs sample size of G = 100,000. 
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Table 2. Parameter estimates 
 
Variable Spatial Probit 
 
Non-Spatial Probit 
 
Farm Employment 
USDA(FARMEMPLOYUSDA) (-7.34) -1.86 (3.31) (-6.76) -0.88 (5.73) 
Incumbent Status(INCUMBENT) (-0.75) -0.19 (0.33) (-0.69) -0.15 (0.40) 
Member of Democratic 
Party(DEMOCRAT) (-1.07) 0.09 (1.13) (-1.04) 0.15 (1.22) 
Percent Agricultural PAC 
Money(AGPAC) (0.97) 3.54 (6.24) (1.35) 3.93 (6.55) 
Urban Population %(URBAN) (-3.09) -2.20 (-1.19) (-3.68) -2.69 (-1.82) 
Win Last Election %(WINLAST) (-1.03) 0.33 (1.59) (-0.95) 0.38 (1.69) 
Member Agricultural 
Committee(AGCOM) (-0.26) 0.44 (1.17) (-0.20) 0.46 (1.15) 
Market Value of Production(MVP) (-21.31) -4.76 (12.99) (-24.16) -7.50 (9.50) 
Government Payments(GP) (-17.27) 1.47 (18.89) (-16.86) 1.07 (19.16) 
ADA Score(LQ2001) (-0.87) 0.37 (1.74) (-1.04) 0.31 (1.84) 
Constant (0.31) 1.57 (2.80) (0.74) 2.03 (3.34) 
Note: Estimates are based on a burn-in sample size of S = 100,000 and a Gibbs sample size of G 
= 100,000.  Ninety-five percent highest posterior density limits are reported in parentheses. 
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Table 3. Marginal effects estimates. 
 
Variable Spatial Probit 
 
Non-Spatial Probit 
 
Farm Employment 
USDA(FARMEMPLOYUSDA) (0.07) 1.46 (3.23) (-2.18) -0.25 (1.76) 
Incumbent Status(INCUMBENT) (-0.16) -0.03 (0.08) (-0.23) -0.05 (0.11) 
Member of Democratic 
Party(DEMOCRAT) (0.03) 0.45 (0.80) (-0.28) 0.06 (0.44) 
Percent Agricultural PAC 
Money(AGPAC) (0.13) 1.83 (2.94) (0.05) 1.11 (2.41) 
Urban Population %(URBAN) (-2.39) -1.64 (-0.11) (-1.33) -0.78 (-0.05) 
Win Last Election %(WINLAST) (0.03) 0.47 (0.93) (-0.31) 0.11 (0.58) 
Member Agricultural 
Committee(AGCOM) (0.01) 0.15 (0.32) (-0.06) 0.14 (0.42) 
Market Value of Production(MVP) (-17.23) -8.98 (-0.55) (-8.88) -2.18 (2.85) 
Government Payments(GP) (-6.58) -0.49 (5.25) (-6.02) 0.33 (6.69) 
ADA Score(LQ2001) (-0.80) -0.40 (-0.02) (-0.36) 0.07 (0.52) 
Constant (0.09) 1.32 (2.04) (0.03) 0.59 (1.17) 
Note: Estimates based on a burn-in sample size of S = 100,000 and a Gibbs sample size of G = 
100,000.  Ninety-five percent highest posterior density limits are reported in parentheses. 
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Figures 
 
  
Figure 1.  Posterior probability density function for the spatial correlation coefficient.  Estimates 
are based on a burn-in sample size of S = 100,000 and a Gibbs sample size of G = 100,000.   
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Figure 2. Impact on House votes of incremental increases in PAC contributions.  The dark 
shaded entries denote predictions derived under the preferred model specification( ≡ W(2,1)) and 
the remaining neighbourhood designations, depicted attaining the maximum vote capacity in 
order are, respectively as follows: W(2,5); W(2,4);  W(2,3); W(2,2); ‘magenta’ ≡ W(2,0).  Estimates are 
based on a burn-in sample size of S = 100,000 and a Gibbs sample size of G = 100,000.   
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